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Abstract. It is well known that different arguments appeal to different
people. We all process information in ways that are adapted to be consis-
tent with our underlying ideologies. These ideologies can sometimes be
framed in terms of particular axes or dimensions, which makes it possible
to represent some aspects of an ideology as a region in the kind of vector
space that is typical of many generalised quantum models. Such models
can then be used to explain and predict, in broad strokes, whether a
particular argument or proposal is likely to appeal to an individual with
a particular ideology. The choice of suitable arguments to bring about
desired actions is traditionally part of the art or science of rhetoric, and
today’s highly polarised society means that this skill is becoming more
important than ever. This paper presents a basic model for understand-
ing how different goals will appeal to people with different ideologies,
and thus how different rhetorical positions can be adopted to promote
the same desired outcome. As an example, we consider different nar-
ratives and hence actions with respect to the environment and climate
change, an important but currently highly controversial topic.
1 A Clash of Ideologies
Climate change is a hotly debated and disputed topic in the United States, Aus-
tralia, and several other countries. For example, at the beginning of April 2015,
the President of the USA gave a speech connecting climate change to personal
health [7], while on the other hand, the Treasurer of the state of Wisconsin
[14] led an initiative to ban employees of the Board of Commissioners of Pub-
lic Lands from discussing climate change. Taken out of context, such headlines
might be quite surprising: for example, if the purpose of the Wisconsin ban is
really (as claimed by its supporters) to prevent employees from wasting time on
non-work-related activities, one would expect other topics to be explicitly banned
in a similar manner, or at least, one would expect a quantitative demonstration
that discussing climate change was an especially large drain on the resources of
the Board in question.
In context, however, such speeches and decisions make much more sense.
Politics generally tends to bundle issues together into platforms, and these are
often associated with political parties: that is, issues become partisan. The US
provides a particularly extreme example right now. There are a great range of
divisive political issues currently under debate, including climate change, gun
control, abortion, foreign relations, even the legality or otherwise of refusing to
sell a wedding cake, and whether the actions of an elected official are scandalous
or business-as-usual. The surprising thing is that on most or all of these issues, it
is expected that knowing whether someone is ‘liberal or conservative’, or ‘Demo-
crat or Republican’ will predict their position with considerable accuracy. Not
all issues are polarised in this fashion: for example, some anti-vaccination advo-
cates take their stance because they believe the government should not be able to
coerce parents (a belief associated more with some Republicans), whereas some
anti-vaccination advocates take their stance because they believe that vaccines
are chemicals and chemicals are typically harmful (a belief associated more with
some Democrats). However, on many if not most issues, party-political polari-
sation has become normal.
Of course, two-party political systems are especially prone to such rivalry, so
in this case they are particularly obvious. However, identity and ideology guide
many other decisions and actions in our daily lives, often in a much more subtle
fashion. The purpose of this paper is partly to analyze some of these phenomena,
and partly to propose ways forward, or recognize the ways others have already
proposed. In broad strokes, successfully persuading someone to believe something
to which they are ideologically opposed is usually futile. If a theist or an atheist
tries to persuade (respectively) an atheist or theist to believe something different,
this usually results not in any change of mind, but in a reinforced belief that
theists/atheists are typically intolerant and won’t leave others in peace.
Instead, a more useful alternative is often to propose actions that are entirely
consistent with an individual’s current ideology, and also work towards a com-
mon objective. In many walks of life this is already obvious. Businesses want to
increase revenue, but will not try to convince their customers that giving them
money is a good thing: instead, they will try to assure customers that their
products are desirable and money-well-spent. There is no ideological disagree-
ment here, the participants simply have different roles and interests. However,
as issues become more ideological, people often want to ‘win the argument’, even
as (ironically) the chances of this become smaller and smaller. These are pre-
cisely the sort of situations where seeking common-ground which is away from
the theatre of conflict can be most effective.
In the rest of this paper, we will describe some of the current scientific litera-
ture around the framing of ideologies and how these affect which new information
is accepted and which decisions are taken. Some of this literature already uses
spatial models with different conceptual axes. This lends itself naturally to a
representation of the “common ground” idea, as new axes are introduced. This
method follows the same pattern as the Purposeful Choice model of Widdows
[19], but as well as adding objective axes to represent desired states or goals,
we also add rhetorical positions to suggest arguments that may be persuasive to
different individuals in reaching these goals.
2 Framings in Society
In society, ideologies often arise as a product of group-membership. The benefits
of gathering together in groups are well-known, for example, in the Descent of
Man, Darwin wrote:
All animals living in a body, which defend themselves or attack their
enemies in concert, must indeed be in some degree faithful to one another;
and those that follow a leader must be in some degree obedient. [4, Ch. 4]
Darwin goes on to describe many of the animal and human behaviors that
arise from this principle, including various forms of empathy, conscience, remorse,
avoiding shame and seeking praise. Most of Darwin’s examples pertain to action
rather than belief, but others have applied such rules of group membership to
study beliefs as well, for example, Braman et al. state that:
Given how much the ordinary individual depends on peers for support
— material and emotional — and how little impact his beliefs have
on the physical environment, he would likely be best off if he formed
risk perceptions that minimized any danger of estrangement from his
community. [12].
This connection between belief and belonging is already ancient. A particu-
larly strong example is found in some western monotheist religions, where be-
longing to a religious group is identified with ‘sharing a faith’. Such shared
understandings are particularly powerful, the group is a hard thing to leave.
Psychology has adopted these notions using two key concepts: framings and
ideologies. A frame is a perspective or context within which a concept is un-
derstood. One of the best understood examples of framing stems from the work
of Tversky and Kahneman [17], who showed that asking the same question can
lead to significantly different responses when it is framed in a positive or nega-
tive light. Stronger still, an ideology could be thought of a frame that a person
acquires as they grow up. Ideologies are generally thought of as fixed, meaning
that they do not change very much once they are acquired, through inheritance,
culture, and experience. In what follows we shall focus upon one conceptualisa-
tion of an ideology, the grid group framework that was proposed by Douglas [5]
and Wildavsky [20].
3 A Case in Point: Skepticism about Climate Change
While much of the work in QDT considers idealised or simple cases, it could
have very real relevance in our understanding of many modern global problems,
a number of which have become highly polarising [12]. Scientific facts are be-
ing re-framed according to the preferences of individuals in specific ideological
groups, and this can result in vastly different understandings about the risks as-
sociated with issues like climate change, vaccinations, drugs, and environmental
damage. These debates have led to a cynicism about whether it is possible to
shift attitudes and opinions towards a public consensus about how we should
act in the face of increasing societal challenges. Is a shared understanding of the
risks associated with these problems even possible?
Some recent studies have started to create hope that a re-framing of these
social debates could be achieved, and lead to outcomes that are more consistent
with the findings of science about “what needs to be done”. For example, Bain
et al. [3] provide an example where the long running debate surrounding climate
change belief or disbelief is reframed. They show that when asking a person
about their intention to act in a way that might mitigate the climate change
problem, framing it in three different ways can have a significant effect. Thus,
climate change deniers stated that they intended to act in a manner that was
more environmentally friendly when they were asked about this intended action
within the context of two alternative frames that centred around forming a
society that was: (i) more considerate and caring; or (ii) more economically and
technologically developed. These results were demonstrated over two different
studies, with N=155 and N=347 climate change skeptics.
Another study by Kahan et al. [10] tested a two-channel communication
strategy where scientific information (channel 1) was combined with cultural
meanings (channel 2) in a two-nation (United States, n = 1,500; England, n
= 1,500) study. While the scientific information was held constant, the cul-
tural meaning of it was manipulated. This led to a finding that the standard
cultural polarisation about climate change science could be decreased by expos-
ing subjects to information about geoengineering. Interestingly, this study found
that subjects exposed to information about geoengineering were more concerned
about climate change risks than a control group.
Finally, Kitto et al. [13] have reported an order effect, where re-framing a
question about climate change belief by asking questions about scientific and
political belief first appears to decrease the likelihood of people denying that
climate change is happening, and increase the likelihood of people claiming that
it is happening (admittedly with a small sample of climate change skeptics).
These are highly interesting effects. Much of the literature to date has tended
to demonstrate that climate change belief is driven by underlying cognitive ide-
ologies, and is not amenable to change. Thus, Kahan et al. [12] demonstrates the
manner in which increasing science literacy actually serves to polarise a nation-
ally representative population from the United States, along what are basically
progressive and conservative lines. Of particular note, this study demonstrates
that those who deny that human-induced climate change is occurring become
even stronger in their disbelief as they become more educated (similarly, be-
lievers become stronger in their belief as they become more educated). Such an
observation contradicts the ongoing assumption that “if we only had more data
people would believe us”. In fact, more data is likely to induce a greater level
of disbelief for someone who has an ideology that is hostile to climate change
science.
4 A Subspace Model of Ideologies and Points of View
The work discussed above [6, 15, 13] suggests that multiple factors lead to skep-
ticism about climate change. However, when coupled with the work of Bain et
al. [3] we see that the understanding an individual expresses about an issue can
perhaps be shifted when the point of view from which they are considering the is-
sue is shifted. Here, we attempt to understand these results using the Purposeful
Point of View model proposed by Widdows [19].
Fig. 1. The grid-group framework proposed by Douglas [5] and Wildavsky [20], and
used to explain much ideologically driven behaviour. Hierarchical Individualists are
strongly correlated with discounting the risks associated with climate change.
One of the underlying cognitive factors most predictive of climate change
skepticism is that provided by the grid group framework [20]. In stark con-
trast to the common conservative-liberal spectrum, this schema makes use of
two dimensions to represent the commitment of a person, broadly to (a) the
strength of group boundaries (Individualism → Communitarianism), and (b)
the number and variety of prescriptions that a society should make (Egalitar-
ianism → Hierarchy). In Fig. 1. we see these relationships mapped out on a
two dimensional grid. A person falls somewhere on each of the two scales to
end up categorised into one of four cultural worldview quadrants, or ideologies:
Hierarchy-individualism (HI); Hierarchy-communitarianism (HC); Egalitarian-
individualism (EI); and Egalitarian-communitarianism (EC). Surveys are tra-
ditionally used to find out where people fit on this two dimensional spectrum.
While the grid group framework is most often sketched out as an orthogonal
set of axes, there is no a priori reason why this would be the case in reality. Of
particular interest to our current argument, people who are denoted as hierar-
chical individualists tend to be those most likely to express views corresponding
to climate change skepticism [9].
While a large amount of work has been completed in the area of climate
change denial, the grid group model is general, and it has been used to explain
many different attitudes to risk and social norms (see e.g. [8, 11] for some exam-
ples). Climate change denialism is just one of the most intensely studied. What
we are interested in for the purposes of our current argument is the idea that
cultural worldviews (along with many other factors, some of which are probably
yet to be discovered) are key drivers when it comes to the acceptance or rejec-
tion of a rhetorical position. We also note that all categories on the grid group
framework show evidence of being affected by their underlying ideology. For ex-
ample, one recent paper [11] shows that people from all ideologies are more likely
to get basic mathematical problems wrong when they are framed in terms of a
competing ideology. None of us are immune to the ideologies that we inherit,
acquire, and grow as we develop. Once formed they can have a significant effect
upon our capacity for logical reasoning.
5 Scaling Up: A general model of skepticism and rhetoric
For the sake of clarity, we shall consider two subsets of the population; hierar-
chical individualists and egalitarian communitarians. These two highly polarised
ideologies, lie at opposite corners of Figure 1, and are responsible for some of the
most interesting behaviours that have so far shown up in the literature in this
field. In traditional understandings, these ideologies are considered very static,
they do not change, and drive most of the behaviour that we see surrounding
attitudes towards climate change, immunisation etc.
We can represent these ideologies using a standard basis in a 2-dimensional
Hilbert space: |HE〉 , |CI〉. For the sake of simplicity, these axes are considered
to be perpendicular to each other. Semantically, this means they can vary inde-
pendently: in terms of information retrieval, they may even be considered to be
irrelevant to one another [18, Ch. 8]. By contrast, the positions HI and EC in
this model are genuinely opposite or mutually exclusive. This is an important
intuitive difference between quantum and Boolean logics: north and south are
opposites, but the north-south and east-west directions are orthogonal comple-
ments, and so the operation that corresponds algebraically to ‘logical NOT’ is
orthogonal projection, not scalar multiplication by −1. This assumption of or-
thogonality simplifies the modelling that follows, but we note that it is possible
to make use of the formalism of Positive Operator Valued Measures (POVM) to
relax it [2], which would lead to a more realistic (if somewhat more complex)
model.
In practice, people are highly unlikely to align completely with one or the
other ideology, they will lie somewhere in between, and we represent the cognitive
state |ψ〉 of this type of more complex individual using the standard superposi-
tion relationship:
|ψ〉 = a |HI〉+ b |EC〉 . (1)
How will this cognitive state affect the propensity of a person to act upon climate
change? It depends upon the context that they find themselves in, and their
resulting point of view.
5.1 Scenario 1: different results of an action
If the discussion is framed around the question “Do you believe in climate
change?” then the states are already quite fixed. For adherents of HI, the notion
of belief in climate change is already framed as belonging to a different group
that is identified with opposition to their way of life and worldview. If they are
approached from a belief/disbelief framing then they will almost certainly fall
back into a situation where they state that anthropogenic climate change is not
occurring. Similarly, the EC is highly likely to express belief in climate change








Fig. 2. How the idea of belief in climate change might appear to an observer who
already identifies with groups that reject this belief.
5.2 Scenario 2: aligning incompatible ideologies using different
points of view
Based upon the results discussed above [3, 8], we know that reframing the issue
of climate belief (or more importantly here, disbelief), can lead to a higher prob-
ability that a person who is skeptical about climate change might nonetheless
become more likely to act to mitigate its effects. In the case of Bain et al. the
reframing was towards a nicer, more caring, or more technologically advanced so-
ciety [3], a result which suggests a way forwards. Instead of insisting that skeptics
should believe in climate change, an alternative is to propose actions that they
can agree on, whether or not belief in climate change is accepted beforehand.
This scenario can be straightforwardly represented in the Point Of View
(POV) model. All that we require is a POV state that is directed in such a
manner that people closely aligned with the hierarchical individualist ideology
will become more likely to consider climate change worth acting upon (than
they did in the belief state). The crucial addition here is that we need more


















Fig. 3. Objectives and actions that may appeal to individuals with various ideologies
Such a model is depicted in Figure 3. In this model we have introduced a third
dimension, which is an objective axis in the sense of [19], labelled Sustainable
Prosperous World. Naturally this is an objective that all participants are likely
to consider reasonable, in spite of ideological differences about how is might be
achieved. Three different POVs are represented in Figure 3, each projecting out
from an initial underlying grid group worldview:
Hierarchical Individualist: This POV is a vector that sees a sustainable pros-
perous world as arising through appropriate resource management.
Egalitarian Communitarian: This POV moves towards the same outcome
but from the perspective of climate change belief.
Egalitarian Individualist: This POV takes personal health and wellness as
the driving reason for trying to achieve a sustainable prosperous world.
Note that despite these ideological differences, all parties are converging towards
the same endpoint in Figure 3. This is a markedly different outcome to that which
we currently witness in the world media as it covers contentious issues (where
it is highly polarised). However, there is some fit in this scenario with our lived
experience; when two people from opposing ideologies meet and connect before
they start to discuss climate change, they often have a far more sensible (i.e.
convergent) discussion. Such anecdotes pervade society, and are supported by
the data from [3], but until now they have been difficult to consistently model.
However, with our new POV based understanding of this situation, we can now
talk about what might occur in a rhetorical situation that primed our subjects
to consider a sustainable prosperous world (rather than their state of climate
change belief). Statements can themselves be represented as a vector in our
Hilbert space (perhaps with the addition of extra dimensions as necessary), and
we can now start to explore the implications of this using a toy model.
5.3 A toy mathematical model
As suggested by [1, 19], this scenario may be modelled by assuming that people
judge similarity from a specific point of view, making it very difficult to judge
the similarity of two concepts, say moon and ball in an absolute sense. On the
surface they are completely dissimilar, but if we are asked to judge them from
the point of view of shape then they quickly become highly similar in our minds.
Such a concept holds immediate relevance for the current discussion. When asked
to consider the validity of a statement such as
A: We should reduce CO2 emissions by burning less fossil fuels.
then we expect that people will judge this statement by considering its similarity
to their current point of view. In particular, those with a Hierarchical Individu-
alist (HI) point of view have been shown in studies to reject this statement [9].
This likely rejection is modelled by a large angle between HI and Reduce CO2
emissions in Figure 3. We could however consider a different statement, such as















































































Fig. 5. Smaller angles indicate actions that may appeal more to a particular POV.
A person with a Hierarchical Individualist point of view might be more inclined
to agree with this statement. This greater likelihood of agreement is modelled
by a much smaller angle between HI and Resource Management in Figure 3.
These angles are explicitly highlighted in Figure 4, where clearly cos(HI ,B) >
cos(HI ,A). (Here we assume the standard procedure in information retrieval of
using the cosine of the angle between two vectors as a measure of similarity,
which we interpret as making agreement more likely.) The greater appeal of
statement B becomes even more apparent when viewed from the point of view
of an HI observer whose goals are aligned with the Sustainable Prosperous World
objective axis marked SPW in Figure 5. Here the comparison between similarities
is given by the inequality cos(SPW−HI ,SPW−B) > cos(SPW−HI ,SPW−A).
From the perspective of HI, B and SPW are closely aligned, whereas A is much
less relevant.
This toy model thus considers two rhetorical devices: one to introduce the
SPW objective axis, and another to introduce the statement B as an alternative
to A that is less jarring to the HI point of view. Between these, the angle between
HI and the statement proposing a given action has been much reduced, and
thus the similarity or agreement between the purposes and actions has been
significantly increased.
It is important to note that the HI point of view has not been changed in
this discussion. Instead of trying to change someone’s ideology or point of view,
the discussion has introduced objectives and actions that make sense from their
pre-existing point of view.
There are immediate mathematical problems for this model. For example,
since the H and E axes are opposite, their cosine similarity would be −1. This
makes an immediate description in terms of (say) quantum probabilities chal-
lenging. Also, the angles themselves may be misleading, and only the relative
comparisons between angles may make sense. (For example, both the angles in
Figure 5 are smaller than the angles in Figure 4.) Recently, a more complete
quantum model of similarity has been developed [16], and it will be interesting
to see if that model provides any more insight into the way in which such a
scenario might play out. We note also that while we have made heavy use of
the grid-group framework in deriving this model, there is no a priori reason why
this must be so. Other well-accepted descriptions of ideologies could well provide
suitable ground-spaces for such a model. Nonetheless, the formalism presented
here appears to capture some of the effects discussed above.
6 Conclusions
Ideologies and worldviews are a key factor that drive the acceptance or rejec-
tion of many issues that are well understood by science (e.g. the acceptance of
human induced climate change). While ideologies appear to be immutable and
unchanging, some recent results give us reason to believe that reframing highly
polarized debates might be possible, but this is a different phenomenon to math-
ematically model. In this paper we have proposed a Point of View model, which
allows us to show how a statement will be interpreted according to a person’s
underlying worldview, according to a grid group framework. The model shows
that there is a natural way in which to model the difference that a subject per-
ceives to lie between some statement and their underlying worldview, and we
have linked this to the possible acceptance or rejection of that statement. If one
can be generated that aligns key social questions with the ideology of the subject,
then it may be possible to generate a consensual approach towards solving key
socio-environmental and technological problems that society is currently facing.
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